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How 
Washington Got 
Its Act Together 
by ANTHONY J. HOPE / Associate Director, Washington Service Center 
Throughout the 1980 presidential campaign, candidate Ronald Reagan argued against regula-
tory clutter—contending that the only 
way to boost American productivity is 
to free business from unnecessarily 
complex and contradictory tax policy 
regulations, and paperwork. Simple, 
straightforward, and predictable 
regulations, he maintained, is the only 
acceptable alternative. 
To Washington watchers, this rhetoric 
was not new; but there was a differ-
ence this time, one of record. As 
governor of California, Ronald Reagan 
had demonstrated his willingness to 
fight the legislature and the bureaucrats 
in the effort to unburden business from 
unneeded regulation. He didn't win 
that war, but he won many battles. 
And he never, ever gave up the fight. 
The draft of the Economic Recovery 
Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) was remarkable in 
that it was an uncluttered attempt to 
stimulate the economy through tax 
cuts—the first such attempt since the 
Kennedy years. What was equally 
remarkable was that ERTA had its 
genesis in 1978 as a Republican alterna-
tive to President Carter's ill-fated tax 
proposal. A brief look at the history of 
the Revenue Act of 1978 and ERTA 
will help in understanding how the 
Congress arrived at the Tax Equity and 
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 and 
where we may be going from here. 
What Went Wrong in 78 
The Democrats were in firm control of 
both the House and the Senate in 1978. 
But mid-term elections always have 
been dangerous for the majority party 
since its members traditionally have lost 
seats to the underdogs. The Hill 
leadership wanted the same type of 
legislation they had been getting for 
years: sock the rich, help the poor, and 
quietly give the rich enough complex 
loopholes to keep the large campaign 
contributions flowing. But a growing 
minority on the Hill was trying a new 
approach—a comprehensive tax cut to 
stimulate the staggering economy. 
What the Carter administration 
brought to the Hill was a grab bag of 
political issues that most observers 
thought would help neither the 
Democrats at the polls nor the econ-
omy. It was no secret that President 
Carter disdained Washington and didn't 
understand the process. His three-
martini-lunch proposal typifies how not 
to manage legislative issues. Cutting 
back on business's fringe benefits 
always has been a popular reelection 
rallying cry. What the Carter people 
didn't know is that you can talk for 
months about the health benefits of 
avoiding booze and cholesterol, or the 
fiscal benefits of raising revenue by 
eliminating deductions, but the reality 
is that such measures are rarely put to a 
vote. Those running for reelection 
refused to be put in the dilemma of 
having to vote one way or the other on 
this issue. They didn't want to alienate 
businessmen, restaurateurs, restaurant 
worker's unions, and credit card com-
panies. Nor did they want to be viewed 
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as favoring three-martini lunches. 
Nonetheless, Carter's tax team came 
to the Hill armed with press releases to 
show that the president opposed big 
businessmen and supported the little 
guy. It took the leadership of both 
parties in both houses months to 
quietly kill the measure. 
The rest of the 1978 effort was not 
much better. The few capital formation 
incentives emerged muddled; there 
were a few good points, but no 
coherent policy. In November, the 
Republicans gained 12 House seats, 
three Senate seats, and six governor-
ships. It was an average mid-term result. 
How the Good Guys Won 
While the battle over the 1978 Revenue 
Act was being waged, three Wash-
ington tax lobbyists began meet-
ing for breakfast every Tuesday at 
the Sheraton Carlton Hotel to share 
ideas. They knew that a comprehensive 
tax bill was needed, and they knew that 
the capital formation incentives in the 
proposed act were insufficient. Calling 
themselves the Carlton Group, these 
lobbyists decided to forget 78 and to 
plan for 1981. 
Charls E. Walker, the group's leader, 
was then chairman of Governor 
Reagan's tax policy task force and once 
had been the deputy secretary of the 
Treasury Ernest S. Christian, a tax expert 
at the Washington law firm of Patton, 
Boggs & Blow, had formulated the first 
drafts of a 10-5-3 depreciation schedule 
proposed three years before, when he 
was deputy assistant secretary of the 
Treasury for tax policy. While not 
accepted then, the depreciation mea-
sure was dusted off and resurrected 
three years later. Richard Rahn, 
currently the chief economist for the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, once was 
the chief of the American Council for 
Capital Formation. The nominal lineup 
of the coalition was Walker for Repub-
licans, Christian for Democrats, and 
Rahn for business. 
After the 1978 bill was passed, the 
group was joined by two powerful 
members of the House Ways and 
Means Committee, James R. Jones 
(D-Okla.) and William Steiger (R-Wisc), 
who sensed the need for a tax bill that 
was a tool for a strong economy rather 
than a vehicle for reelection. They 
lamented, however, that the business-
men were more divided about what 
was needed than the politicians. Those 
in the Northeast, for example, were 
fighting those in the Sunbelt; it was 
incentives for new construction versus 
those for rehabilitation. Simililarly big 
business was squaring off against small 
business over capitalizing research and 
development. Jones and Steiger (later 
replaced by Barber Conable) joined 
the group with the understanding that 
its goal had to be to unite business 
behind a single conceptual framework. 
When Ronald Reagan was elected, he 
brought that framework with him in the 
form of supply-side economics. A clean, 
comprehensive bill was prepared. 
Everyone understood that compromises 
and concessions with the Democratic-
controlled House would clutter the bill, 
but all expected minimal damage. 
David Stockman, director of the 
Office of Management and Budget, and 
Donald Regan, the Treasury secretary, 
led the administration team; Bob Dole 
guided in the Senate; Barber Conable 
directed the Republican minority in the 
House; and the Carlton Group was 
charged with holding the business 
community lobbies together. The only 
conflict amongst them was whether 
supply-side economics would work 
well enough on the economy that the 
The Congressional Lobbyist 
Comes of Age 
As recently as 25 years ago, the - popular image of the Washing-
ton lobbyist was one of an old man 
in a baggy suit and brown fedora 
who lurked in Capitol Hill bars with 
a paper bag stuffed wi th wrinkled 
twenties. All this has changed. 
Lobbyists not only have cleaned up 
their acts, but through an interwoven 
series of three events they have 
emerged as the single most powerful 
force on Capitol Hil l . 
The first of these three events was 
the proliferation of federal programs. By 
the 1960s, the residue of New Deal 
programs and the decision to never 
again dismantle the military machine 
were taxing the power of Congress to 
manage its affairs. Then came the war 
in Vietnam and President Johnson's 
Great Society We would have "guns 
and butter," and a tripling of the 
bureaucracy needed to procure and 
manage them. The programs were so 
big and came so fast that Congress's 
committee system short-circuited. 
The power war among committees 
for jurisdiction over the new programs 
left in its wake a protracted confusion 
within the programs and a lack of 
coherent legislative direction. 
The second event was the prolifera-
tion of paper in the method of 
gathering information for the congres-
sional decision making process. In less 
complex times, appropriate agency 
officials would be called to testify 
before congressional committees 
concerning their agencies' past or 
intended actions. During the McCarthy 
era, the process became more confron-
tational, as the executive branch 
officials tried to protect themselves 
from attack. During the sixties and 
seventies the situation further deterior-
ated as the Vietnam and Watergate 
experiences raised new barriers to 
communication. Congressional 
committees began to develop their 
own information through new, perma-
nent investigative staffs. Committee 
meetings erupted into battles between 
congressional aides wielding stacks of 
photocopied charts and executive 
branch officials protecting their turf 
with charts and printouts of their own. 
Meanwhile, computers and copiers 
produced so much paper that the staffs 
found themselves unable to absorb and 
synthesize the data needed for congres-
sional decisions. Congress had lost 
confidence in the testimony of the 
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budget could be balanced by 1984 
without making massive defense cuts. 
The bill's passage by the Senate 
seemed a foregone conclusion, but 
passage by the House came easier than 
expected because the conservative 
southern Democrats threatened mutiny 
within the party if the House didn't 
support the new president's plan. 
But time was working against them. 
They expected a bill in March, then 
April, but there was no action. Finally, in 
late May, the boat began to rock. As the 
recession broadened, projected tax 
revenues decreased. The administration 
threatened to offset the deepening 
deficits by reducing the business tax 
president's people, just as the testimony 
became too complex for Congress. 
Finally, the power structure that made 
Congress's work flow was being 
dismantled by the members them-
selves. Before 1974, the seniority 
system allowed the two parties to 
rigidly control their management of 
committee business through a semiper-
manent system of allocating power to 
senior chairmen. Since 1974, the 
committees have elected their own 
chairmen, and now an additional layer 
of political maneuvering has replaced 
the old order. Congress could no longer 
manage itself, direct federal programs, 
nor synthesize the data it generated. 
What was needed was a trustworthy, 
off-line information system that would 
provide timely, succinct, and accurate 
advice on issues. Enter today's congres-
sional lobbyist. 
Today's lobbyist is a member of the 
Washington professional service corps, 
the industry sector which recently has 
outstripped the federal government as 
the largest employer in the capitol. 
He or she is a professional, usually 
with a legal or political background, 
who represents a client's or organiza-
tion's interest in matters pending 
before Congress. For a substantial fee, 
the lobbyist brings three talents to 
bear on a client's problem. He needs 
judgment to recognize what can be 
cuts. This time, it was business that 
reacted swiftly and decisively. The first 
week of June became "Lear Jet Week," 
as businessmen poured into Wash-
ington to flex their muscles in a 
show of unity so strong that they not 
only killed any threat of a tax increase 
but increased proposed business tax 
benefits by as much as $40 billion over 
the next 10 years. Democratic opposi-
tion was crushed with the final House 
vote of 238 to 195 in favor of the bill. 
TEFRA of 1982 
The year 1981 passed into history with 
David Stockman admitting that there 
was a question whether the tax-cut 
done and to formulate an action plan. 
He needs leadership ability to direct the 
technicians, legal draftsmen, runners, 
and other lobbyists interested in the 
same issue. But access to the members 
of Congress is the key element. 
When the mood of Congress starts to 
shift on an issue, the well-cultivated 
congressman will call his friend the 
lobbyist and warn him of impending 
danger. He calls because the lobbyist is 
his friend and confidant—maybe even 
the godfather of his children. But most 
of all, he calls because they have 
developed a mutual early warning 
system based on complete trust and 
integrity. The speed of the legislative 
process just before a vote is so great and 
so complex that complete trust 
between the member and the lobbyist 
is vital. Members will sandbag each 
other; but a lobbyist won't sandbag a 
member unless he is willing to make a 
lifelong enemy. 
This is not to say that Congress has 
abnegated its responsibility to the hired 
guns of Washington. Each issue has 
many sides, and the congressman or his 
staff aides will get reports from all who 
are lobbying for or against an issue, as 
well as from many who would enlarge, 
contract, or redirect its scope. 
Yet, as Sam Rayburn once said, the 
first law of Congress is "get reelected," 
and smart members make sure they 
have the lobbyists and their PACs 
behind them when they need them. 
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concepts would work. The five months 
lost in getting started would translate 
into a year or two lost in progress. 
Since ERTA, the recession has 
deepened, even as inflation has been 
brought under control and the prime 
rate has come down. The press and 
the Democrats have become very 
displeased with the results of Reagan-
omics, moreover, and have seized on 
the one attention-getting economic 
indicator that has moved out of the 
administration's reach—the first double-
digit unemployment in 30 years. 
Reaganomics wasn't a failure; it just 
wasn't working yet. It never had been 
hailed as a quick fix, and its inception 
had been delayed. But the federal 
deficits were increasing, and the 
projected revenues were decreasing. 
Still, the president refused to make up 
the difference with defense cuts. 
The strategy on which the adminis-
tration decided was a stopgap. While it 
would not retreat from the tax cuts of 
1981, it would propose revenue mea-
sures for 1982 to enhance cash flow, 
such as excise tax increases on tobacco 
and alcohol. Bob Dole was given the 
task of raising the $100 billion needed to 
meet the budget short-fall. In exchange, 
he was promised by the Reagan staffers 
that they would not interfere with the 
strategy he chose for raising the revenue. 
From the lobbyist's point of view, it 
was back to business as usual. If they 
wanted the impact against their client 
eased, they would have to suggest that 
it would be more fair to gore someone 
else's client. The Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) was 
passed with much cutting and snipping, 
and with little in the way of a coherent 
philosophy. The results of the 1982 
mid-term elections were predictable: 
the Democrats won 26 House seats, no 
Senate seats, and around a half dozen 
governorships. 
For the future, the most interesting 
development is that the president has 
steadfastly refused to cut defense 
spending. If he holds this course, and if 
the economy doesn't turn around, 1983 
will bring another TEFRA. The philos-
ophy will be to fix the problems with 
cash flow until the economy fixes itself. & 
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